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THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND JUDICIAL ECONOMY AT THE 







Following the civil unrest in Kenya in 2008 and Kenya’s inability to prosecute the 
perpetrators of those crimes, the ICC prosecutor initiated proceedings proprio motu 
against Mr Uhuru Kenyatta and Mr William Ruto. Despite the impending 
prosecutions, Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto were elected as President and Deputy 
President of Kenya in 2013. Due to their prominent status, they both applied 
(separately) to be excused from continuous attendance at their trial proceedings. Mr 
Ruto’s argument was heard first, and Trial Chamber (A) granted the excusal request. 
In the course of Mr Kenyatta’s hearing by Trial Chamber (B), but before the Appeals 
Chamber reversed Mr Ruto’s Trial Chamber (A) decision, the issue of judicial 
economy was raised by the prosecution. Their contention was that Trial Chamber (B) 
should in fact wait for the Appeals Chamber’s final decision, but the Chamber 
dismissed the argument and proceeded with the decision at hand. This article contends 
that the Court missed a real opportunity to place judicial economy within the human 
rights discourse, particularly in the light of Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute.  
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1. Introduction 
Following the civil unrest in Kenya in 20081 and Kenya’s inability to prosecute the 
perpetrators of those crimes,2 the ICC prosecutor initiated proceedings proprio motu 
against Mr Ruto and Mr Kenyatta.3 At the time of the relevant events, Mr Kenyatta 
                                                            
 Lecturer in Law, Brunel Law School, Brunel University, London, Patricia.Hobbs@brunel.ac.uk.  
1) Following the 2007-2008 contested presidential election, nearly 1,200 people died, over 350,000 
were displaced, and numerous counts of rape and sexual assaults took place; see G Lynch and M 
Zgonec Rožej, ‘The ICC Intervention in Kenya’, Chatham House AFP/ILP 2013/01.  
2) See P Kagwanja, ‘Courting Genocide: Populism, Ethno-Nationalism and the Informalisation of 
Violence in Kenya’s 2008 Post-Election Crisis’ (2009) 27(3) Journal of Contemporary African Studies 
365.  
3 ) See ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization to Open an Investigation in the Situation of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19 Corr. (26 November 
2009); ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II Decision Requesting Clarification and Additional Information, ICC-
01/09 (18 February 2010) and ICC-01/09-19 (31 March 2010).  
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was the leader of the Party of National Unity (PNU) and Mr Ruto led the United 
Republican Party (URP), each representing their respective ethnic groups, the 
Kikuyus and the Kalenjins. 4  Following the civil unrest, they formed the Jubilee 
Alliance, demonstrating political unity after the 2008 ethnic-centred political crisis,5 
which eventually led to the 2013 Presidential election. Despite the impending ICC 
proceedings against them,6 Mr Kenyatta was elected new President of Kenya, and Mr 
Ruto took up the role of Deputy President. 
This article concerns the (separate) applications made by the two defendants, Mr 
Ruto7 and Mr Kenyatta,8 to be excused from attending their criminal proceedings at 
the International Criminal Court (ICC). They argued that their prominent roles as 
Kenyan State officials should excuse them from attending their respective trial 
proceedings on a continuous basis, and therefore both applied – albeit separately – to 
be excused from attendance. Apart from certain limited circumstances, it is widely 
accepted that the defendant’s presence in court is required during criminal trials in 
order to ensure that proceedings are conducted in such a way as to maintain the 
necessary high standards of fairness and justice.9   
Mr Ruto’s argument was heard first. After Trial Chamber (A)’s decision that he 
should be excused from attendance of trial proceedings, 10  the case went to the 
Appeals Chamber, as it was believed that Trial Chamber (A) erred in law in granting 
Mr Ruto excusal from attendance. However, as the Appeals Chamber was deciding on 
this issue,11 Trial Chamber (B) was hearing the same argument with regard to Mr 
Kenyatta. Rather than waiting for the Appeals Chamber’s decision, which in fact 
                                                            
4) See G Lynch, ‘Courting the Kalenjin: The Failure of Dynasticism and the Strength of the ODM 
Wave in Kenya’s Rift Valley Province’ (2008) 107(429) African Affairs 541; S Jenkins, ‘Ethnicity, 
Violence, and the Immigrant-Guest Metaphor in Kenya’ (2012) 111(445) African Affairs 576. 
5) See E Bollrich, ‘Kenya’s Jubilee Hangover: Torn Between Domestic Turmoil and International 
Affairs’ (2014) International Policy Analysis. 
6) Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 January 2012, ICC-01/09-02/ll-382-Red. 
7) Excusal Application, Defence Request pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-
01/11-685.  
8)  Excusal Request, Defence Request for Conditional Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ICC-
0109-02/11-809. 
9)  See Article 6(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950; Article 14(3)(d) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966, 999 UNTS 171.  
10) Defence Request pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-01/11-685, ICC 01/09-
01/11, 18 June 2013.  
11) Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber V(A) of 18 June 
2013 entitled ‘Decision on Mr Ruto's Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial’, ICC 
01/09-01/11 OA5, Appeals Chamber, 25 October 2013. 
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reversed Trial Chamber (A)’s decision to excuse Mr Ruto from attendance – Trial 
Chamber (B) proceeded on the same issue and, just like Trial Chamber (A), granted 
Mr Kenyatta excusal from attendance. 12  Given that the Appeals Chamber was 
deciding on the very same issue, the prosecution argued that it would be in line with 
the principle of ‘judicial economy’ to wait for the Appeals Chamber’s decision.13 The 
majority of the Chamber, however, disagreed, without giving any further 
explanation.14 Judge Ozaki, in his partially dissenting opinion, confirmed that it is in 
the interests of all parties that ‘proceedings are conducted efficiently and with 
minimal burden to the Court’s system and resources’.15 Nevertheless, he agreed with 
the Chamber’s decision to proceed given the uncertainty regarding the timing of the 
Appeals Chamber’s decision.16  
It is not straightforward to account for the Chamber’s unwillingness to engage with 
the issue of judicial economy, or Judge Ozaki’s dictum. The decision to proceed on 
the basis of the uncertainty surrounding the timing of the Appeals Chamber decision 
could, in fact, be interpreted as a precautionary measure to ensure that Mr Kenyatta’s 
trial proceeds without undue delay, one of the elements of the right to a fair trial17. 
Then again, Mr Kenyatta’s trial was due to start in February 2014,18 he was never 
subject to any forms of detention during these preliminary proceedings, and all 
charges were eventually withdrawn.19 It seems therefore reasonable to deduce that, by 
following the principle of judicial economy, if Trial Chamber (B) had waited for the 
Appeals Chamber’s decision, Mr Kenyatta would not have suffered any detrimental 
consequences and the decision would at least have been in line with the Appeals 
Chamber, which found that Trial Chamber A had erred in granting Mr Ruto the 
excusal from attendance. 
                                                            
12) Decision on Defence Request for Conditional Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial, ICC 
01/01-02-11, 18 October 2013.  
13) Decision on Defence Request for Conditional Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial ICC-
01/09-02/11-830, 18 October 2013, para. 34 (Kenyatta Decision). 
14) Kenyatta Decision, para. 59. 
15) Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ozaki, ICC-01/09-02-11-830-Anx2, 18 October 2013, para. 4.  
16) Ibid, para 6. 
17) See Article 67(1)(c) Rome Statute. 
18) The commencement of the trial was originally scheduled for 11 April 2013 (‘Decision on the 
schedule leading up to trial’, ICC-01/09-02/11, Trial Chamber V, 9 July 2012), but the date was then 
moved to February 2014 (Trial Chamber V(B) ‘Decision adjourning the commencement of trial’, 31 
October 2013) but in January 2014 an order was made vacating the trial and convening a status 
conference (Trial Chamber V(B), ICC-01/09-02/11-886, 23 January 2014). 
19) See Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on the withdrawal of charges against Mr 
Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Trial Chamber V (B), 13 March 2015.  
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Given that judicial economy can have an impact on the right to fair trial, this article 
argues that the ICC should have engaged in a more comprehensive analysis of the 
issue of judicial economy in order to provide a clear reasoning for the proceedings at 
hand rather than waiting for the Appeals Chamber’s decision. The argument is framed 
within a specific aspect of the right to a fair trial, namely the right to be tried without 
undue delay, as the assumption made in this article is that there was a real concern 
that the delay in the proceedings would have affected Mr Kenyatta’s right to a fair 
trial. The backdrop of this discussion is provided by a brief overview of the concept 
of fairness as a driving force for the right to a fair trial. This will be followed by an 
evaluation of the right to a fair trial, with a specific focus on the right to trial without 
undue delay. The section will also consider the rights-centred approach taken by the 
ICC, which confirms the importance to continue to develop and strengthen this aspect 
of the Court’s activity. Lastly, the discussion will move to the concept of judicial 
economy, its current application by the ICC, and will put forward an argument for a 
wider approach in order to embed it within the right to a fair trial framework. 
2. The concept of fairness 
When the ad hoc international criminal tribunals20 were established, the protection of 
the defendant’s rights was a reassuring and timely addition to the international 
criminal justice machinery. In fact, the UN Secretary-General pointed out that the 
tribunal (the ICTY) must ‘fully respect the international recognised standards 
regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of its proceedings’,21 with a specific 
focus on the rights contained in Article 14 of the ICCPR.22 However, one need to look 
at some of the tribunals’ practices, from the illegal apprehension of alleged 
perpetrators,23 to decisions based on ‘dubious’ evidence,24 to surmise that procedural 
                                                            
20) International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), adopted on 25 May 1993 by 
Security Council Resolution 827 (1993); International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), adopted 
on 8 November 1994 by Security Resolution 955 (1994). 
21)  Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to para.2 of the Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 
UN Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 106.  
22)  More specifically, equality before the law and a fair and impartial tribunal (Art. 14(1)); presumption 
of innocence (Art. 14(2)) and a variety of procedural rights in Art. 14(3), including the right to trial 
without undue delay. 
23) For example, see Prosecutor v Slavko Dokmanović, Decision on the Motion for Release by the 
Accused Slavko Dokmanović, Case No. IT-95-13a-PT, T. Ch. II, 22 Oct. 1997; Prosecutor v Dragan 
Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, T. Ch. II.  
24) Barayagwiza v Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR -97-19-AR72, Decision, Appeals Chamber, 31 March 
2000; see J Sloan, ‘Breaching International Law to Ensure its Enforcement: The Reliance by the ICTY 
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fairness, may not have been at the forefront of the tribunals’ work at that time. 
However, international criminal justice has developed quite considerably since the 
establishment of the ad hoc tribunals, and fairness in trial proceedings has become a 
more prominent issue.25  
2.1 Fairness as an egalitarian model 
To understand the prominence of the right to a fair trial, the concept of fairness 
deserves some attention, starting with Rawls’ perspective. He identifies fairness as  
‘formal justice…an aspect of the rule of law which supports and secures 
legitimate expectations. One kind of injustice is the failure of judges and others 
in authority to adhere to the appropriate rules or interpretations thereof in 
deciding claims’.26  
According to Rawls, fairness takes on an egalitarian character, where all enjoy the 
same rights, irrespective of any special status in society. This egalitarian concept may 
be interpreted as deriving from natural law, and therefore resembling an inherent 
feature (and entitlement) of the human condition to seek a fair and just treatment for 
all.27 However, Rawls wrote his treatise with a specific kind of political structure in 
mind, namely a modern constitutional democracy.28 Therefore, despite the attractive 
feature, the egalitarian aspect of fairness, as devised by Rawls, will only apply to a 
specific political society, because fairness is able to make use of concepts that are 
naturally entrenched within institutions of a democratic government.29  
With this in mind, the most obvious starting point, for the purposes of this discussion 
on the right to a fair trial, is the justice system itself. As Rawls declares, ‘justice is the 
first virtue of social institutions’, 30  a principle that is further supported by the 
incorporation of the social contract theories (as put forward by Locke, Rousseau and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
on Illegal Capture’ in T McCormack and A McDonald (eds.), Yearbook of International Humanitarian 
Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006). 
25) See infra, page 12. 
26) J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, Revised Edition, 1999), at 51. 
27) See R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, I977).  
28) J Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’ (1985) 14(3) Philosophy and Public Affairs 
223. 
29) Ibid, at 225. 
30) Rawls, supra note 26, at 3. 
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Kant) and manifested through the ‘original agreement’.31 According to this theory, we 
all accept a universal position of equality, and we accept it because we live under a 
‘veil of ignorance’, that is we are ignorant of our own situation, social class, status, 
wealth etc... This is ‘justice as fairness: it conveys the idea that the principles of 
justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair’.32 This system of beliefs around 
the concept of fairness lead to Rawls’ two principles: the first one focuses on the 
indefeasible claims that all individuals may make, whilst the second principle puts 
emphasis on the fact that social and economic disadvantages should be used as 
opportunities rather than reasons for prejudiced treatment. 33  In other words, the 
democratic political system of governance provides the necessary configuration for 
the attainment of a fair society.    
Having said that, the ‘original agreement’ theory put forward by Rawls may be 
considered as too utopian to be accepted as a realistic starting point, even within a 
democratic system of governance as intended by Rawls. Indeed, the ‘original 
agreement’ was understood by Rawls (as well as Kant34) as a hypothetical situation, 
capable of creating the most optimum foundations for a fair system in society. The 
purity of this view is in fact reflected by what Rawls calls the ‘veil of ignorance’. 
Despite the fact that it would be unrealistic to establish a society or a legal system 
based on the purity of this worldview, it can be argued that, in the context of 
international judicial bodies and practices, the ‘veil of ignorance’ should represent a 
guiding policy and a clear objective in order to ensure fair treatment to all. In the 
context of (international) criminal trials, a correlation of this proposition is that, by 
guaranteeing fairness to all, justice is achieved for all parties through a consistent and 
transparent application of the rules. The egalitarian model of fairness can therefore be 
likened to ‘procedural’ fairness, and this is supported by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I 
in relation to the DRC situation:  
The term “fairness” (equité), from the Latin “equus”, means equilibrium, or 
balance. As a legal concept, equity, or fairness, “is a direct emanation of the 
idea of justice”. Equity of the proceedings entails equilibrium between the two 
                                                            
31) Ibid, at 10. 
32) Ibid, at 11. 
33) Ibid, 42-44. 
34 ) I Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (edited and translated by A. Wood, Yale 
University Press, 2002). 
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parties, which assumes both respect for the principle of equality and the 
principle of adversarial proceedings. In the view of the Chamber, fairness of the 
proceedings includes respect for the procedural rights of the Prosecutor, the 
Defence, and the Victims as guaranteed by the relevant statutes (in systems 
which provide for victim participation in criminal proceedings).35 
2.2 Fairness through legitimacy  
International tribunals have often suffered from a perceived lack of legitimacy, from 
the Tadić challenge in relation to the establishment of the ICTY,36 to the discretion 
exercised by the ICC prosecutor in relation to decisions to prosecute selected 
situations and/or perpetrators.37 With this in mind, Frank develops the concept of 
fairness from a different perspective.38 According to Frank, fairness ‘…is the product 
of social context and history’,39 and comprises of two specific elements: legitimacy 
and distributive justice. 40  Legitimacy entails the creation and application of 
mechanisms, which must be perceived as fair by the participants.41 In the context of 
criminal justice, the implication is that participants (including the victims) are in fact 
able to contribute to the establishment of, and evaluate, the rules and processes that 
make up the legal institutions. This democratic process brings legitimacy to the 
system.42 Distributive justice looks at the same issue, but from a different angle. It 
concerns the appropriate allocation of power (included judicial power) to legal 
institutions if the perception is that those institutions deliver outcomes that are fair to 
all. In other words, distributive justice is concerned with the coherent application and 
consequences of these rules.43   
                                                            
35) ICC PTC I, Situation in the DRC, ICC-01/04, ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s application for leave to 
appeal the Chamber’s decision of 17 January 2006 on the applications for participation in the 
proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6’, 31 March 2006, para. 38.  
36) Prosecutor v Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-
94-1-T, 2 October 1995. 
37) See OHCHR, ‘Making Peace our Own: Victims’ Perceptions of Accountability, Reconciliation and 
Transitional Justice in Northern Uganda’ (OHCHR, Geneva 2007). 
38) TM Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Clarendon Press, 1995). 
39) Ibid, at 14. 
40) Ibid, at 7-9. 
41) Ibid. 
42)  M Glacius, ‘Do International Criminal Courts Require Democratic Legitimacy?’ (2012) 23(1) EJIL 
43. 
43) Ibid; see also J Sunshine and TR Tyler, ‘The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping 
Public Support for Policing’ (2003) 37(3) Law & Society Review 513, at 517. 
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The legitimacy aspect of fairness is not limited to the defendant’s perception of 
fairness with regard to procedural rules, but should also be extended to the victims 
and other relevant parties, including prosecutors.44 In other words, all participants 
must perceive the creation, allocation and use of power by the legal institutions as 
fair. It becomes, therefore, an exercise of neutral objectivity; indeed, ‘judicial virtues 
such as impartiality and considerateness are the excellences of intellect and sensibility 
that enable us to do things well’. 45  It is among the most traditional judicial 
characteristics, to be objective, impartial and considerate, and to administer the law in 
a manner that does not create inequalities amongst different classes of defendants.  
Nevertheless, international judges (just like domestic ones), may be motivated by a 
variety of external factors, which could in fact represent a significant factor in the way 
decisions are taken. As Stephan argues: 
Knowing that they can be replaced, the members of the [international] tribunal have an 
incentive not to do anything that will upset the countries with nominating authority. In 
those cases where the members nonetheless veer off in an unanticipated direction, the 
nominating state can institute a course correction within a relatively short period of 
time by choosing ‘sounder’ candidates for the tribunal. Thus one should not expect 
ambitious, systematic, and comprehensive law coming from an institution endowed 
with the authority to develop unified law on an international level.46 
The existence of any competing interests would have an undesirable impact on the 
application of substantive and procedural fairness, and it would also cast a shadow of 
doubt on the legitimacy of international tribunals. Yet, the argument about the 
possible presence of any competing interests has its basis on the Principal-Agent 
theory, whereby the Principal – the State – may be able to exercise a certain amount 
of influence on the Agent – the appointed international judge.47 In practice, however, 
this is not an easy premise to validate.48 A more adequate theory – and one that is in 
                                                            
44) See Y McDermott, ‘Rights in Reverse: A Critical Analysis of Fair Trial Rights under International 
Criminal Law’ in W Schabas et al (eds.) The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal 
Law (Ashgate, 2012). 
45) Rawls, supra note 26, at 453. 
46) PB Stephan, ‘Courts, Tribunals and Legal Unification – The Agency Problem’ (2002) 3(2) Chicago 
Journal of International Law 333, at 337-8. 
47 ) KJ Alter, ‘Agents or Trustees? International Courts in their Political Context’ (2008) 14(1) 
European Journal of International Relations 33. 
48) G Garrett, ‘The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union’ (1995) 49(1) International 
Organization 171; for a contrasting view see also JHH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 
100(8) Yale Law Journal 2403. 
 9 
line with the aims of international justice – is the Trustee-Principal theory.49 Unlike 
the agent, who has more autonomy but may feel bound by certain contractual 
obligations between him and the state, the trustee enhances  
…the legitimacy of political decision-making. Trustees are (1) selected because of their 
personal reputation or professional norms, (2) given independent authority to make 
decisions according to their best judgment or professional criteria, and (3) empowered 
to act on behalf of a beneficiary.50 
In fact, one of the most encouraging characteristics of the Trustee-Principal theory is 
the underlying fiduciary relationship that exists between the trustee and the main 
actor, in this case the state. And it is precisely this fiduciary relationship that enhances 
the trustworthiness of the judicial decision-making process, thus reducing the 
possibility of abuse of power and maintaining legitimacy.51 This theory finds support 
amongst many academics, including Posner and Yoo,52 who contend, in fact, that 
judicial effectiveness at the international level can only be maintained if there exists a 
certain level of ‘dependency’ between the judges and the appointing state. They also 
argue that the typical independent domestic model finds no realistic application in the 
international context due to the complex political interplay.53 Helfer and Slaughter, on 
the other hand, point to the limitations of their argument that independent judges 
endanger international courts’ effectiveness, citing specifically the weaknesses of 
their methodology. They put forward a theory of ‘constrained independence’, 
according to which, the state demonstrates its credibility towards international 
commitments, but then uses other mechanisms to limit the power of judicial 
decisions.54 
However, it can be argued that the emerging disparities regarding judicial legitimacy 
are essentially due to the different perspectives taken by the aforementioned 
                                                            
49) Alter, supra note 47, at 35. 
50) Ibid. 
51) R Grant and R Keohane, ‘Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics’ (2005) 99(1) 
American Political Science Review 29. 
52) EA Posner and JC Yoo, ‘Judicial Independence in International Tribunals’ (2005) 93(1) California 
Law Review 1.  
53) Ibid, at 13. Posner and Yoo contend that the distinction between ‘dependent’ and ‘independent’ 
tribunals is based on the notion that the former are typically ad hoc international tribunals controlled by 
governments, either through appointment or retaliation (p. 14); ‘independent’ tribunals, on the other 
hand, reflect the domestic model and, due to their ‘moral ideals’ (p. 7), they pose a risk to international 
relations. 
54 ) LR Helfer and A-M Slaughter, ‘Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to 
Professors Posner and Yoo’ (2005) 93 California Law Review 901. 
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academics. The rational-choice theory perspective, generally advocated by Posner and 
Yoo,55 contends that international law is not real law because it does not have a direct 
and independent effect on state’s behavior. According to rational-choice theorists, 
states act rationally to maximize their interests.56 Although this approach has attracted 
quite a lot of criticism,57 the issue of compliance has become a traditional (and at 
times controversial) topic of study in international law. 58  The reality of existing 
political forces, and the corresponding state’s interests, cannot be completely ignored, 
but the objective of international criminal justice, namely to end impunity for 
international crimes, retains its legal rules and procedures. And it is the fair and just 
application of these rules and procedures that reiterates the traditional legal argument 
about compliance, and whether international law is said to be real law. Put in a 
different way, Posner and Yoo, and others, approach the issue of fairness within 
international courts using a top-down model. On the other hand, a more traditional 
perspective, represented by Helfer and Slaughter above, adopts a bottom-up approach. 
Their starting point and analysis are different, but both models contend that the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship (between the state and the international tribunal) 
enhances both the ‘dependent’ and ‘independent’ tribunals, thus furthering fairness 
through legitimacy. 
3. The Right to a Fair Trial 
3.1. Setting the context 
Although the right to a fair trial has evolved significantly over the past decades, it has 
been part of the fundamental guarantees for centuries. Early references to fair trial 
procedures can be dated back to the Lex Duodecim Tabularum (the Law of the 
Twelve Tables) in 450 B.C., the first written laws of the Roman Republic.59 Some of 
the principles expressed at that time can be said to represent the forerunners to the 
modern procedural rights to a fair trial, namely that all parties to the dispute have the 
                                                            
55) Goldsmith can also be added as an advocate of this theory; see, for example, J Goldsmith and E 
Posner, The Limits of International Law (OUP, 2005).  
56) Ibid, at 7. 
57 ) See A von Aaken, ‘To Do Away with International Law? Some Limits to ‘The Limits of 
International Law’ (2006) 17(1) EJIL 289; DF Vagts, ‘International Relations Looks at Customary 
International Law: A Traditionalist’s Defence’ (2004) 15(5) EJIL 1031.  
58) See, for example, M Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of the International 
Legal Argument (OUP, 2005). 
59) See <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ancient/twelve_tables.asp> accessed 25 January 2016.  
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right to be present at the hearing,60 the principle of equality61 and the principle against 
bribery of officials.62  
The Magna Carta constitutes another development in the right to a fair trial, as it set 
out the principle that the law of the land curbed the power for all, including the 
sovereign king’s, establishing the principle that all are equal before the law.63 This 
document, however, must be interpreted as a product of its time, as the king was in 
fact the only lawmaker of the land.64 Notwithstanding this, the Magna Carta – and 
specifically the provision that no free man can be imprisoned without the lawful 
pronouncement of his peers – was destined to become the cornerstone of the right to a 
fair trial, and started a trend that culminated in modern times.65  In fact, the well-
established significance of the right to fair trial in international and domestic law is 
evidenced by its increased use in case law in the latter part of the 20th century and the 
beginning of the 21st century. 66  This trend is indicative of an increasingly more 
balanced relationship between the state and the citizen, and reflects the model of 
authority that the state intends to exercise over its citizens, giving substance to 
principle of equality of arms.67  
Notwithstanding the above, the right to a fair trial has not always been interpreted and 
applied in a just and coherent manner, even in modern times. For example, Justice 
Murphy of the U.S Supreme Court, in his dissenting opinion in the criminal trial 
against General Yamashita, captured the incorrect understanding of this right, namely 
that the right to a fair trial is not 
An uncurbed spirit of revenge and retribution, masked in formal legal procedure for 
purposes of dealing with a fallen enemy commander, can do more lasting harm than all 
of the atrocities giving rise to that spirit. The people’s faith in the fairness and 
objectiveness of the law can be seriously undercut by that spirit.68  
                                                            
60) Ibid, Table I (3). 
61) Ibid, Table IX (1). 
62) Ibid, Table IX (3). 
63) A Lyon, Constitutional History of the United Kingdom (Cavendish Publishing, 2003) at 39. 
64) Ibid. 
65) See P Robinson, ‘The Right to a Fair Trial in International Law, with Specific Reference to the 
Work of the ICTY’ (2009) 3 Berkley J. Int. L. Publicist 1.  
66) I Langford, ‘Fair Trial: The History of an idea’ (2009) 8(1) Journal of Human Rights 37. 
67) D Robertson, A Dictionary of Human Rights (London: Europa Publications, 2004). 
68) In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 1946, at 46. 
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Therefore, irrespective of the appalling atrocities that the defendant is charged with, 
fairness and objectivity provide the framework for the rules that must apply before 
and during trial, thus avoiding a spirit of revenge and retribution. That being said, 
international criminal tribunals did not initially set out to make ‘human rights’ an 
inclusive part of the criminal process. For example, although references to a fair trial 
were included in the Charters for the International Military Tribunals established after 
World War II,69 they seem to point mainly towards a procedural fairness, and the 
IMTFE Charter appears to also allow for a great deal of restrictions of these fair 
procedures, thus widening judicial discretion.70 It was in fact the establishment of the 
ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
Rwanda (ICTR) that heralded a more contemporary phase to human rights protection 
of the accused in international criminal trials. In line with Articles 9 and 14 of the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the ICTY and ICTR 
statutes incorporate basic rights that the accused individual is entitled to.71 It was also 
conceded by the UN Secretary General that ‘it is axiomatic that the International 
Tribunal must fully respect internationally recognised standards regarding the rights 
of the accused at all stages of proceedings’.72 
3.2. The guarantee of a trial without undue delay  
Given the well-documented concerns about the inefficiency of international criminal 
tribunals,73 the practice of judicial economy may help the courts to focus their efforts 
in a structured and principled manner, thus ensuring speedy trials whilst safeguarding 
the defendant’s rights. In other words, efficiency and rights’ protection are not to be 
viewed as competing concepts, but as mutually supportive components of the criminal 
justice machinery for the sole purpose of ensuring the achievement of timely and 
                                                            
69) See Article 16 of the United Nations Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the 
Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis 
(‘London Agreement’), 8 August 1945, 82 UNTS 279 (1945) (henceforth the Nuremberg Charter) and 
Article 9 of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, T.I.A.S. 1589, 4 Bevans 20, 19 
January1946 (henceforth IMTFE Charter). 
70) See Article 9 (d) and (e). 
71) Specifically, Articles 20 and 21 ICTY Statute and Articles 19 and 20 ICTR Statute; also note that 
Article 13 ICTY and Article 12 ICTR specifically require experts in human rights law within the 
judiciary. 
72) Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 
UNSC S/25704, 3 May 1993. 
73) See A Mundis, ‘Improving operations in International Criminal Tribunals’ (2000) 94(4) AJIL 759. 
However, it can also be argued that the complex nature of these cases is a contributing factor to the 
reduced efficiency levels; see S Ford, ‘Complexity and Efficiency at International Criminal Courts’ 
(2014) 29 Emory International Law Review 1. 
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effective justice. This is not a new concern. It is an issue, for example, that has 
preoccupied the Council of Europe for a number of years.74 In fact, according to a 
large study undertaken by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, the 
effectiveness of the human rights protection machinery established by the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 75  depends, inter alia, on the timely 
management of cases.76  
To this end, the majority of human rights legislation, at both domestic and 
international level, includes the right to trial without undue delay, or within a 
reasonable time.77  In order to make a determination that this guarantee has been 
infringed, courts will consider several factors, including the length of the delay, the 
complexity of the proceedings, the conduct of the relevant authorities, the conduct of 
the accused and the prejudice to the accused.78 This is a well-established practice 
within the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and it therefore 
serves as a yardstick for other international tribunals. 79  Moreover, in General 
Comment No. 13, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) clarified the meaning of ‘trial 
within a reasonable time’, or ‘without undue delay’, and specified that the  
guarantee relates not only to the time by which a trial should commence, but also the 
time by which it should end and judgment be rendered; all stages must take place 
“without undue delay”. To make this right effective, a procedure must be available in 
                                                            
74) See the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), ‘Length of court proceedings 
in the member states of the Council of Europe based on the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights’, 6-8 December 2006 (henceforth, CEPEJ study) 
75) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended 
by Protocols 11 and 14, 4 November 1950. 
76) CEPEJ study, supra note 74, at 28. 
77) See Article 14(3)(c) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 
67(1)(c) of the Rome Statute, Articles 20(4)(c) and 21(4)(c) of the Statutes of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR Statute) and for the former Yugoslavia respectively (ICTY 
Statute), Article 7(1)(d) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 8(1) of the 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and Article 6(1) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). 
78) See The Prosecutor v Bizimungo et al., Decision on Jérôme-Clément Bicamumpaka’s Motion 
Seeking Permanent Stay of Proceedings, Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, 27 February 2009, para. 9; see also 
Y McDermott, Fairness in International Criminal Trials (OUP, 2016), at 53. 
79) See Hadjikostova v Bulgaria, application no. 36843/97, 4 December 2003, para. 35; Süßmann v 
Germany, application no. 20024/92, 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, 
para. 48, and Frydlender v France [GC], application no. 30979/96, para. 43, ECHR 2000-VII. 
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order to ensure that the trial will proceed “without undue delay”, both in first instance 
and on appeal.80 
Therefore, any long delays between the defendant’s arrest and the commencement of 
the trial, especially for serious crimes, cannot be justified on the basis of general 
problems encountered by the state following a coup d’état; this delay would amount 
to a violation of Article 14 (3) (c) ICCPR.81 Likewise, a delay between a Court of 
Appeal decision and the final outcome can amount to a violation of Article 14 (3) 
(c),82 as well as a delay of over four years between conviction and dismissal on 
appeal, without valid justifications. 83  The overall approach taken by the HRC, 
however, is that each case is evaluated on its own merits,84 echoing the approach 
taken by the European Court of Human Rights.85 Moreover, a trial without undue 
delay or within a reasonable time, must also serve the interests of justice, in the sense 
that it impacts not only on the defendant but also on the overall criminal justice 
process, as evidenced by the HRC in General Comment 32:  
The right of the accused to be tried without undue delay, provided for by article 14, 
paragraph 3(c) ICCPR, is not only designed to avoid keeping persons too long in a state 
of uncertainty about their fate and, if held in detention during the period of the trial, to 
ensure that such deprivation of liberty does not last longer than necessary in the 
circumstances of the specific case, but also to serve the interests of justice.86 
With this perspective in mind, the Appeals Chamber for the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL)87, with reference to Article 14 ICCPR, confirmed that the right gives a 
guarantee to the defendant, but also added that  
…for international human rights law it offers a vital and concomitant guarantee to 
victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity…Victims and relatives of victims 
                                                            
80 ) Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13, Article 14 (Twenty-first session, 1984), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 14 (1994), para. 10. 
81 ) Sandy Sextus v Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 818/1998, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/72/D/818/1998 (2001), para.7.2. 
82) Abdool Saleem Yasseen and Noel Thomas v Republic of Guyana, Communication No. 676/1996, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/62/D/676/1996 (31 March 1998), para. 7.11. 
83) Girjadat Siewpersaud et al v Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 938/2000, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/81/D/938/2000 (2004), para. 6.2 
84) Ibid, para. 6.1. 
85) See Pelissier v France 25444/94 [1999] ECHR 17 (25 March 1999), para. 67.  
86) Human Rights Committee, General Comment 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and 
tribunals and to a fair trial, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), para. 35. 
87) Agreement between the United Nations and the Government Of Sierra Leone on the Establishment 
of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2178 UNTS 138; UN Doc. S/2002/246, 16 January 2002.  
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are entitled to have those accused of hideous offences which have caused them so 
much grief to be tried expeditiously. Similarly, the international community which 
establishes special courts expects them to work expeditiously as well as fairly. That 
justice delayed is justice denied is no less true for being a truism.88 
Notwithstanding the above, it must be acknowledged that international criminal trials 
are generally very complex by their very nature, and therefore can be very lengthy.89  
At times, it is the defendant himself who seeks to either obstruct or delay 
proceedings, 90  a practice that can be further aggravated by the right to self-
representation.91 However, the actual process of gathering evidence can represent a 
real obstacle in itself, and therefore adding to the complexity of the trial,92 which is 
additionally impaired by the actual amount of evidence occasionally produced.93 
4. Fair trial at the International Criminal Court 
4.1 The Rome Statute recognition of the right to a fair trial 
Despite previous attempts to incorporate fair trial standards and procedures, it is the 
Rome Statute that truly integrates these standards within its criminal procedure, 
ensuring that the defendant is afforded the same level of rights’ protection as he or she 
would receive in a domestic criminal trial. For the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
this is not just about the concept of fair trial but it is also about the legitimacy of the 
court itself.94 The spirit of revenge and retribution may have characterised the first 
international criminal trials,95 whereas the ad hoc tribunals may be remembered as a 
collective response to the failure of the international community to stop the atrocities 
                                                            
88) Prosecutor v Norman et al., Decision on the Application for a Stay of Proceedings and Denial of 
Right to Appeal, SCSL-2003-08-PT (4 November 2003), para. 8. 
89) See G Boas, The Milošević Trial: Lessons for the Conduct of International Criminal Proceedings 
(CUP, 2007). 
90)  See Prosecutor v Norman et al., Decision on Prosecution Motion for a Ruling on the Admissibility 
of Evidence, SCSL-04-14-PT (24 May 2005). 
91 ) MP Scharf, ‘Self-Representation versus Assignment of Defence Counsel before International 
Criminal Tribunals’ (2006) 4(1) JICJ 31.  
92) MS Ellis, ‘Achieving Justice Before the International War Crimes Tribunal: Challenges for the 
Defense Counsel’ (1997) 7(2) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 519. 
93)  See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Prosecutor v Ruto et al., Urgent Defence Application for 
Postponement of the Confirmation Hearing and Extension of Time to Disclose and List Evidence, ICC-
01/09-01/11, 11 august 2011, para. 3  
94 ) D Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International 
Criminal Law’ in S Besson and J Tasioulas (eds.) The Philosophy of International Law (OUP, 2010) at 
579. 
95) See V Gehring (ed.), The Ethical Dimensions of Global Development (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005) 
at 11. 
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unfolding on our television screens.96 The ICC, however, is fundamentally different in 
nature from its ad hoc predecessors. It is a permanent treaty-based international court, 
established through the sovereign states’ aspiration to end impunity for international 
crimes. As such, the ICC had to satisfy specific criteria in relation to state 
sovereignty. In other words, it must guarantee, inter alia, that its criminal procedures 
will echo the legitimate mandate given to it by consenting sovereign states.  
There is, therefore, a strong correlation between the mandate given to the ICC, and 
the emerging standards expected in international criminal law proceedings. These are 
the standards accepted by the international community, represented in this context by 
the member states to the Rome Statute. The fair rules are therefore linked to the 
international community,97 because it is the international community that gives them 
legitimacy through the ratification process. The ICC, in turn, achieves legitimacy 
through compliance with well-established international human rights laws applied by 
the same sovereign states that consented to extending their traditional criminal 
jurisdiction to the ICC. Its legitimacy, therefore, is bolstered by the inclusion of 
several rights of the accused, starting with the protection of the defendant’s rights 
during investigative proceedings,98 to the Trial Chamber assurance that the trial will 
be fair and expeditious,99 to the presumption of innocence,100 and to extensive rights 
of the accused during the actual trial.101  
4.2 Article 21 (3) of the Rome Statute and ‘internationally recognised human rights’ 
Article 21 (3) of the Rome Statute stipulates that ‘the application and interpretation of 
law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human 
rights…’. The content of this article represents the willingness of state parties to give 
the utmost assurance to defendants that the ICC may even be obligated to set aside 
rules that may conflict with international human rights norms. This is indeed a 
significant provision, and has been likened to a superior norm,102 even to the point of 
                                                            
96) See G Gagnon et al, ‘The Collective International Responsibility to Protect: The Case of Darfur’ 
(2005) 4(1) Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 118. 
97) See Franck, supra note 38. 
98) Article 55 Rome Statute. 
99) Article 64 Rome Statute. 
100) Article 66 Rome Statute.  
101) Article 67 Rome Statute. 
102) A Pellet, ‘Applicable Law’ in Antonio Cassese et al (eds), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary Vol. II (OUP, 2002) at 1079. 
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amounting to a norm possessing a constitutional character, according to some 
academics.103 It can also be asserted that this provision may in fact confer more 
powers to the court than originally conceived,104 thus allowing the ICC chambers to 
widen their interpretation of the applicable law,105 though there is no consensus yet on 
this point. 
In the Lubanga case, 106  Judge Pikis stated that customary international law and 
international treaties represent strong indicators of the status of ‘internationally 
recognised human rights’. As such, the right to a fair trial, according to his opinion, 
would qualify as an ‘internationally recognised human right’.107 The complexity of 
the International Criminal Court, however, should not be underestimated, especially 
as it deals with national laws, regional and international treaties, and other decisions, 
in order to find the correct interpretation to a provision that may be considered to be 
too vague.108 As Sheppard writes: 
Uncertainty with respect to the Court's applicable law imposes a great burden on all 
parties. Each of the Prosecutor, Defense, Victims’ Representatives, Public Counsel and 
Registry will, in all likelihood, have to make submissions on the powers and 
obligations of the Court in light of its human rights obligations at some point. Without 
foreknowledge of what those obligations are, or even how to determine what they are, 
participants cannot tailor their submissions, nor meaningfully plan ahead with a clear 
sense of how a dispute may be resolved.109 
Having said that, the groundbreaking approach of Article 21 (3) confirms that a 
human rights-centric approach will guide the interpretation and application of the law, 
and the Appeals Chamber in the Lubanga case confirms this: 
Article 21(3) of the Statute stipulates that the law applicable under the Statute must be 
                                                            
103) W Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on Rome Statute (OUP, 2010), at 
398. 
104) MH Arsanjani, ‘The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (1999) 93(1) AJIL 22, at 28. 
105) J Powderly, ‘The Rome Statute and the Interpretative Corseting of the Interpretative Judicial 
Function’ in C Stahn (ed.) The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (OUP, 2010), 485. 
106) The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-424, Decision on the Prosecutor's 
“Application for Leave to Reply to ‘Conclusions de la defenseen reponse au memoire d’appeal du 
Procureur’”, Separate Opinion of Judge Georghios M Pikis (12 September 2006) (ICC, A.Ch.). 
107) Ibid, para. 3. 
108 ) See D Sheppard, ‘The International Criminal Court and “Internationally Recognized Human 
Rights”: Understanding Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute’ (2010) 10(1) International Criminal Law 
Review 43. 
109) Ibid, at 44. 
 18 
interpreted as well as applied in accordance with internationally recognized human 
rights. Human rights underpin the Statute; every aspect of it, including the exercise of 
the jurisdiction of the Court. Its provisions must be interpreted and more importantly 
applied in accordance with internationally recognized human rights; first and foremost, 
in the context of the Statute, the right to a fair trial, a concept broadly perceived and 
applied, embracing the judicial process in its entirety...Where fair trial becomes 
impossible because of breaches of the fundamental rights of the suspect or the accused 
by his/her accusers, it would be a contradiction in terms to put the person on trial. 
Justice could not be done. A fair trial is the only means to do justice. If no fair trial can 
be held, the object of the judicial process is frustrated and the process must be 
stopped.110  
Although the context of this dictum is about the manner in which evidence had been 
obtained, it can clearly be applied to any procedure that may infringe the rights of the 
accused, and therefore compromise the fairness of the judicial process. A correlation 
of this argument is that the interpretation of article 21(3) can expand the rights of the 
accused, as the Appeals Chamber found in the Lubanga case. The Court decided that 
procedural impropriety could trigger a stay of proceedings,111 even if this specific 
procedure is not incorporated in the rights of the accused under Article 67 of the 
Rome Statute.112 Despite the fact that this wider interpretation of Article 21 (3) may 
yield a positive outcome, it can also produce incoherent ones, as demonstrated in the 
Katanga case.113  Here the Trial Chamber, for the first time, set aside a specific 
provision of the Rome Statute, as its application would have led to an inconsistent 
application of internationally recognized human rights.114    
In this context, the ‘internationally recognised human right’ in need of protection 
related to the right to seek asylum, in line with, inter alia, the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the Status of Refugees, 
                                                            
110) The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-772, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defense Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court 
pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006 (14 December 2006) (ICC, A.Ch.), para. 
37. 
111) Ibid, para. 39.  
112) See C Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (OUP, 2015), 486-
488. 
113) The Prosecutor v Germaine Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on 
an Amicus Curiae application and on the “Requête tendant à obtenir présentations des témoins DRC‐
D02‐P‐0350, DRC‐D02‐P‐0236, DRC‐D02‐P‐0228 aux autorités néerlandaises aux fins dʹasile” 
(articles 68 and 93(7) of the Statute), TC, 9 June 2011. 
114) Ibid, para. 73. 
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Article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principle of 
non-refoulement. 115  Article 93(7) Rome Statute allows the Court to request the 
transfer and custody of a person for the purposes of identification or for giving 
evidence or other assistance, but the witnesses must be returned to the requested state 
as soon as the objective of the transfer has been satisfied. It is therefore a provision 
that could, albeit temporarily, deprive a person of his/her freedom. In the Katanga 
case, the ICC detained three witnesses after completion of their testimony, which was 
argued to be in contravention of their rights to liberty and effective remedy, in 
accordance with Articles 5 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).116  
After three years of detention, the Appeals Chamber117 decided that, in fact, the ICC 
had no jurisdiction to detain the three witnesses and that it was solely the Dutch 
Government’s responsibility to grant them the asylum application for an effective 
remedy.118 The Appeals Chamber concluded that the Court should have never refused 
to comply with its obligations under Article 93(7), as this would jeopardise its 
cooperation agreement with its member states.119 As such, Article 21(3) cannot be 
interpreted in a manner that is contrary to the nature of the court, being a judicial body 
and not an administrative detention unit for asylum seekers.120 In other words, the 
Court’s authority to detain individuals (in accordance with Article 93(7)) is limited to 
instances that are related to the Court’s judicial proceedings. 121  The Court must, 
therefore, interpret its obligations under Article 93(7) in conformity with Article 
21(3).122  
This course of action is further supported by the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber II 
concerning the Prosecution’s application to dismiss in limine the Victims’ request for 
review of the Prosecution’s decision to temporarily suspend active investigation in the 
                                                            
115) Ibid, para.67. 
116 ) International Justice Monitor, Lawyers Bring Petition Against the Dutch State for Unlawful 
Detention of Congolese Witnesses in ICC Trial, 7 September 2012, at 
<http://www.ijmonitor.org/2012/09/lawyers-bring-petition-against-the-dutch-state-for-unlawful-
detention-of-congolese-witnesses-in-icc-trial> accessed 10 February 2016. 
117) Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, Order on the implementation of the cooperation agreement between the Court and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo concluded pursuant article 93 (7) of the Statute, ICC-01/04-02/12A, 
12 January 2014. 
118) Ibid, para. 24. 
119) Ibid, para. 26. 
120) Ibid, para. 27. 
121) Ibid. 
122) Ibid, para. 30. 
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Kenya situation, due to lack of cooperation from Kenya.123 It was clearly stated in this 
case that the Pre-Trial Chamber does not have the power to review the Prosecutor’s 
decisions, and therefore there is no need to resort to Article 21(3) as an alternative 
interpretative tool,124 much to the disagreement of the victims’ group.125 Although it is 
possible to review the ICC Prosecutor’s decision when it concerns a determination not 
to investigate a referred situation,126  the Rome Statute is silent in relation to the 
review of a prosecutor’s decision to terminate an on-going prosecution.127  
Remarkably, the language used in the victims’ group response is evocative of one of 
the most prominent regional human rights instruments, namely the European 
Convention of Human Rights. 128  The Rome Statute is compared to a living 
instrument, and it therefore requires that ‘its provisions be interpreted and applied so 
as to make its safeguards practical and effective’.129 If the Rome Statute is indeed a 
living instrument, then it must be capable of evolving according to new challenges, 
and Article 21(3) may indeed represent a new challenge with respect to the manner in 
which fair procedures are interpreted and applied. There is in fact an argument that 
Article 21(3) raises international human rights to a ‘standard against which all the law 
applied by the Court should be tested’, 130  leading to Article 21(3) conceivably 
becoming an ‘overarching framework’ of supra-legality, and even resembling the 
character of a jus cogens norm. 131  Though the Court does not have explicit 
jurisdiction to set aside provisions of the Rome Statute or even to re-interpret them in 
a manner that was not envisaged during the negotiation process, the full impact of 
Article 21(3) is yet to be seen. Nevertheless, the Rome Statute provisions in relation 
                                                            
123) ICC Kenya Situation, Prosecution’s application to dismiss in limine the Victims’ request for review 
of Prosecution’s decision to cease active investigation, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/09, 25 August 
2015 (Dismissal of victims’ request). 
124) Ibid, para. 52. 
125) ICC Kenya Situation, Victims’ response to Prosecution’s application to dismiss in limine the 
Victims’ request for review, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/09, 15 September 2015 (Victims’ response). 
126) Articles 53 (2) (c), 53 (3) (a) and (b) Rome Statute.  
127) In fact, it was the difficult circumstances in relation to the lack of cooperation that prevented 
effective investigations (Dismissal of victims’ request, fn. 82, para. 24) 
See also C Stahn, ‘Judicial review of prosecutorial discretion: five years on’ in C Stahn and G Sluiter 
(eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (OUP, 2009), at 270-273. 
128) See G Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a Living Instrument: its meaning and legitimacy’ in A Føllesdal et al 
(eds.), The European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context (CUP, 
2013). 
129) Victims’ response, supra note 125, para. 13. 
130) G Bitti, ‘Article 21 and the Hierarchy of sources of Law before the ICC’ in C Stahn (ed.), The Law 
and Practice of the International Criminal Court (OUP, 2015), at 434. 
131) A Pellet, ‘Applicable Law’ in A Cassese et al, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary (Vol. II) (OUP, 2002), at 1081. 
 21 
to fair trial, and the inclusion of Article 21(3), point towards the recognition of the 
centrality of human rights within this international criminal law regime. It is within 
this context that the discussion now moves towards an evaluation of the concept and 
use of judicial economy by the ICC, and its place within the human-rights centred 
approach adopted by the Court. 
5. Fitting judicial economy within the right to a fair trial framework 
5.1 Defining the scope of judicial economy 
The discussion at the beginning of this article revealed that Trial Chamber (B) dealt 
with the concept of ‘judicial economy’ in a fleeting manner. Whilst allowing the 
hearing concerning Mr Kenyatta’s excusal from trial proceedings, the Appeals 
Chamber was about to overturn Trial Chamber (A) decision concerning Mr Ruto’s 
excusal from attending his trial proceedings. In other words, there was no debate that 
would provide a logical rationale to justify the Court’s proceedings to go ahead. The 
discussion on the right to a fair trial, presented in the previous sections of this paper, 
places the Court in a very positive light, and clearly demonstrates its commitment to 
protect the rights of all parties. But how does judicial economy fit within this 
framework?   
As international prosecutions can be very lengthy and expensive, budget concerns 
have become more prominent as the international community continues to maintain 
its commitment to ending impunity for international crimes. From the costly ad hoc 
tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,132 to the permanent International 
Criminal Court and to the establishment of hybrid tribunals, the international 
community has experimented with different forms of international justice in order to 
demonstrate its commitment (and duty) towards effective prosecutions.133  Judicial 
economy can be succinctly summarised as ‘[e]fficiency in the management of a 
particular litigation or the courts in general…[and]…measures taken to avoid 
unnecessary effort or expense on the part of the court or the court system’.134 It comes 
to no surprise, therefore, that this principle has been widely adopted by international 
                                                            
132) R Zacklin, ‘The Failings of Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals’ (2004) 2(2) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 541. 
133) For an in-depth discussion on the budgetary resources of the different international tribunals see M 
Wierda and A Triolo, ‘Resources’ in L Reydams et al (eds.) International Prosecutions (OUP, 2012). 
134) J Wallace and SE Wild, Webster’s New World Law Dictionary, 2006, at 164.  
 22 
courts, even though it is occasionally used as a strategic and political tool to satisfy 
member states.135  
The specific procedures aimed at supporting judicial economy do not need to be 
explicitly incorporated in international instruments, as they are part of fundamental 
canons of adjudication, 136  and judges are indeed expected to make use of this 
principle.137 The principles of res judicata and lis pendens represent some of the 
manifestations of judicial economy, and at the same time they embody the essence of 
a criminal trial. Essentially, ‘with respect of the same crimes, there must not be two or 
more criminal trials simultaneously (lis pendens), or successively (…res judicata)’.138 
Notably, some international instruments have explicitly incorporated them in their 
admissibility procedures139, and given proliferation of international tribunals, it is 
even more essential to strengthen the practice of judicial economy in order to avoid, at 
the very least, conflicting outcomes.140   
In addition to the provision of a framework for judicial economy, these procedural 
mechanisms also contribute to the framework of the right to a fair trial, as they 
specifically protect defendants from overzealous prosecutorial practice. By the same 
token, it can be argued that there are certain elements of the concept of judicial 
economy that may sit uneasily within the right to a fair trial, as efficiency could 
compromise this fundamental right, though the right to be tried without undue delay 
needs to fit within this framework. Therefore, expeditiousness of proceedings can be 
considered as an element of the right to be tried without undue delay, though it is not 
to be evaluated independently.  
There are other mechanisms, which, although not entirely part of the judicial 
economy framework, aim to expedite trials to ensure the right to be tried without 
                                                            
135) ML Busch and KJ Pelc, ‘The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization’ (2010) 
64(2) International Organization 257; see also LR Helfer and A Slaughter, ‘Why States Create 
International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo’ (2005) 93(3) California Law 
Review 1, at 51.   
136) FM Palombino, ‘Judicial economy and the limitations of the scope of the decision in international 
adjudication’ (2010) 23(4) Leiden Journal of International Law 909, at 910. 
137) Ibid. 
138) G Sluiter et al (eds.) International Criminal Procedure – Principles and Rules (OUP, 2013), at 436. 
139) For example, Article 9 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and Article 35 (2)(b) ECHR; see also S Flogaitis et al (eds.), The European Court of Human 
Rights and its Discontent: Turning Criticism into Strength (Edward Elgar, 2013). 
140) A Reinitsch, ‘The use and limits of res judicata and lis pendens as procedural tools to avoid 
conflicting dispute settlement outcomes’ (2004) 3(1) The Law and Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals 37. 
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undue delay. For example, it is widely known that some of the pre-trial practices 
adopted by the ad hoc ICTY and Rwanda tribunals led to appallingly (and costly) 
lengthy trials, mainly due to the combination of the inquisitorial and accusatorial 
practices embedded in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE).141 These pre-trial 
procedures have conceivably affected both the partiality of proceedings142 as well as 
the fairness to the accused due to lack of adequate funding for the defence team and 
lack of state cooperation with regard to the gathering of evidence.143 With this in 
mind, Higgins has put forward some proposals to ensure fairness and expediency of 
pre-trial stage: first, an Independent Investigative Commission should be appointed to 
carry out investigations for both the defence and the prosecution, thus maintaining 
fairness and transparency.144 She also proposes an increased judicial intervention at 
the pre-trial stage of proceedings, specifically aiming at the management of the 
indictments,145 as well as the provision of more resources for the defence.146   
Some of these proposals to enhance fairness of proceedings can be seen in practice. 
For instance, the ICC has imposed the duty on the prosecutor to search for and 
disclose any exculpatory evidence,147 has given enhanced powers to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, 148  and has included victim participation ‘in a manner which is not 
prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial 
trial’. 149  With regard to the management of indictments, this is an issue that is 
particularly problematic in the context of complex international criminal trials with 
reference to undue delay, thus affecting the right to a fair trial. Persons who are 
accused jointly of the same crime may be tried separately in order to avoid conflict of 
                                                            
141)  Rules 89(F), 92bis and 92ter ICTY RPE and Rule 92bis ICTR RPE. 
142) M Fairlie, ‘The Marriage of Common and Continental Law at the ICTY and its Progeny, Due 
Process Deficit’ (2004) 4 International Criminal Law Review 243.  
143)  G Higgins, ‘Fair and Expeditious Pre-Trial Proceedings – The Future of International Criminal 
Trials’ (2007) 5(2) JICJ 394.   
144)  Ibid, at 396.  
145)  Ibid, at 398.  
146)  Ibid, at 399.   
147)  Rome Statute Articles 67(2) and 54(1)(a) respectively. Note, however, that the duty to disclose is 
not without problems, as evidenced by the application to stay proceedings in the Lubanga case due to 
the fact that ‘the trial process has been ruptured to such a degree that it is now impossible to piece 
together the constituent elements of a fair trial’ (Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Decision on the 
consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and 
the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the 
Status Conference on 10 June 2008’, 13 June 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1401, para 93).   
148)  Rome Statute Articles 56 and 57.  
149)  Rome Statute Article 68(3). See also J Jackson, ‘Finding the Best Epistemic Fit for International 
Criminal Tribunals – Beyond the Adversarial-Inquisitorial Dichotomy’ (2009) JICJ 7(1) 17.  
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interests and protect the interest of justice. 150  However, severance of charges or 
proceedings is subject to the consideration of several issues, including judicial 
economy, undue delay and the right to an expeditious trial.151 Despite the fact that the 
severance procedure aims at supporting the right to be tried without undue delay, it is 
also possible that this procedure could have the opposite effect, as evidenced by the 
severance procedure applied in the Duch case by the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). 152  In this case several factors – the length of the 
indictment (400 pages), the age and poor health of the defendants and the limited 
resources – led to the application of the severance procedure in the interest of 
justice. 153  Nevertheless, the same procedure also led to complex challenges and 
uncertainties, not necessarily as a result of the severance procedure itself, but rather as 
a result of its poor execution. 154  The important lesson to learn with regard to 
severance and judicial economy is that the wider spectrum of fair trial rights must be 
taken into consideration when applying this procedure, and judges should manage it 
in a ‘careful and proactive’ manner.155 
5.2 The application of judicial economy at the ICC 
To date, the ICC has applied the principle of judicial economy in a variety of settings, 
though there seems to be a prevalence of its use in the context of the confirmation of 
charges stage. For example, in order to distinguish cases that go to trial and cases that 
do not, Pre-Trial Chamber I in Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana stated that the 
application of the standard of ‘substantial grounds to believe’, used for the purpose of 
confirmation of charges, ensures judicial economy.156 Likewise, in Prosecutor v Sang 
and Ruto, Pre-Trial Chamber II stated that the purpose of a determination under 
Article 61(7) of the Rome Statute is to protect suspects from wrongful prosecutions, 
                                                            
150)  See Rules 2, 72, 73, 82(B) ICTY RPE; Rules 83(b), 72(a) ICTR RPE; Rule 136 ICC RPE.  
151) Sluiter et al (eds.) supra note 138, at 532.  
152) Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Law Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea, GA Resolution 57/228, 18 December 2002; Severance Order Pursuant to Internal Rule 
89ter, Case 002, ECCC Trial Chamber, 22 September 2011 (hereafter ‘Trial Chamber Severance 
Order’), para. 2.  
153) Rule 89ter ECCC Internal Rules.  
154) S Williams, ‘The Severance of Case 002 at the ECCC – A Radical Trial Management Technique or 
a Step Too Far’ (2015) JICJ 13(4) 815. 
155)  Ibid, 843. 
156) ‘Decision on the Confirmation of Charges’, ICC-01/04-01/10, 16 December 2011, paras. 40 and 41. 
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thus ensuring judicial economy by blocking unmeritorious cases to proceed to trial.157 
Similarly, an investigation of evidence of alibi will not be carried out if there is not 
sufficient evidence of criminal responsibility, ensuring judicial economy and fairness 
of proceedings.158 Moreover, the evidentiary threshold itself, as set out in Article 
61(7), is higher than the one required for the issuance of an arrest warrant or 
summons to appear,159 thus protecting the suspect against wrongful prosecution and 
ensuring the application of judicial economy by carefully selecting the suitable cases 
to proceed to trial.160 
In the context of the efficient use of the Court’s resources,161 the joinder or severance 
procedure in respect of charges162 also contributes to judicial economy. It allows 
witnesses to give evidence only once, thus minimising the impact of the proceedings 
on them, and avoids duplication of evidence.163 Moreover, the early disclosure of the 
main lines of defence to the prosecution allows the latter to address them properly as 
they present their case, thus promoting justice and judicial economy. 164  These 
procedures ensure the fairness and speediness of the trial, whilst also protecting the 
rights of the victims and witnesses. 165  In addition, the right to ask questions to 
witnesses at trial is laid down in the ICC Rules166 and inspired by judicial economy.167  
In the light of the above examples, the Court appears to make use of the concept of 
judicial economy in a very narrow sense, and adopts it in very limited circumstances. 
The main issue with the Trial Chamber (B) discussion in the Kenyatta excusal 
decision is that the judges refused to engage with the principle of judicial economy. 
This would have been an excellent opportunity to integrate the principle within the 
                                                            
157) ‘Decision of Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) & (b) of the Rome Statute’, ICC-
01/09-01/11, 23 January 2012, para 40. 
158) Ibid, paras. 105 and 110. 
159) The standard applied in these cases is the ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ as set out in Article 58(1) 
of the Rome Statute rather than the ‘substantial grounds to believe’ as set out in Article 61(7) of the 
Statute. 
160) Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/05-01-08, 15 June 2009, 
para 28. 
161 ) See, for example, the Report on Activities and Programme Performance of the International 
Criminal Court for the Year 2012, ICC/ASP/12/9, Proposed Programme Budget for 2014 of the 
International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/12/10 (Twelfth Session, 20-28 November 2013, The Hague).  
162) Article 64(5) of the Rome Statute and Rule 136 of the ICC Rules of Evidence and Procedure. 
163) See ICC-01/04-01/07-257, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 10 March 2008, at 7-8. 
164) See ‘Decision on the Disclosure by the Defence’, Prosecutor v Lubanga, Trial Chamber I, ICC-
01/04-01/06, 20 March 2008. 
165) Article 64(2) of the Rome Statute. 
166) Rule 140 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
167) R Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Law and Procedure (CUP, 2010), at 489. 
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wider human rights framework. In fact, the manner in which the Chamber so readily 
dismissed the principle, leads to the conclusion that the ICC generally interprets 
judicial economy in a narrow sense only. This is in line with the examples cited 
above, which apply the principle of judicial economy as a filtering mechanism to 
ensure the Court proceeds with the prosecution of valid cases only.  
5.3 Undue delay and judicial economy in Mr Kenyatta’s excusal decision 
In the Bemba case,168 it was stated that the expeditiousness of the trial is one of the 
factors that secures the fairness of the trial proceedings. This is what prompted the 
admission of all evidence, which in turn was said to contribute to the accused being 
tried without undue delay.169 However, both the defence and the prosecution appealed 
the decision on the basis that the expeditiousness in favor of the accused did not 
comply with the principle of orality, in accordance with Article 69 (2) of the Rome 
Statute. In fact, the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s decision on the 
basis that expeditiousness, whilst an important factor of fair trial, cannot trump a 
legislative provision.170 The Chamber emphasized that the principle of orality could 
be sidestepped only if such action was ‘not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the 
rights of the accused or with the fairness of the trial generally’,171 something that the 
Trial Chamber failed to examine.172 
Accordingly, a procedure that leads to an expeditious trial – thus supporting the right 
to be tried without undue delay – does not necessarily imply that fairness is applied 
consistently across all participants to the proceedings. The right to be tried without 
undue delay exists within the overall principle of the right to a fair trial, and it 
therefore subsists within the overarching concept of fairness. In a sense, the right to 
be tried without undue delay tends to favor the accused, but fairness is a process that 
affects all participants in the criminal justice machinery. As stated above,173 fairness 
                                                            
168) Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-1022, Decision on the admission of 
evidence of materials contained in the prosecution’s list of evidence, 19 November 2010, TC III. 
169) Ibid, para. 23; see also E Trendafilova, ‘Fairness and expeditiousness in the International Criminal 
Court's pre-trial Proceedings’ in C Stahn and G Sluiter (eds.) The Emerging Practice of the 
International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) at 441.  
170)  The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-1386, Judgment on the appeals of 
Mr Jean- Pierre Bemba Gombo and the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber III entitled 
‘Decision on the admission into evidence of materials contained in the prosecution’s list of evidence’, 3 
May 2011, AC, para. 55. 
171) Ibid, para. 78. 
172)  Ibid, para. 79. 
173) Supra, section 2. 
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must be considered as an all-embracing egalitarian (procedural) and legitimacy-
enhancing value and, as the Bemba case demonstrates, one element of fairness 
(expeditiousness of the trial) should not be allowed to undermine other procedural 
elements or the general principle of fairness. 
With this in mind, attention is drawn again to the assumption that the ICC Chamber 
moved forward with the proceedings in order to expedite the trial, in line with General 
Comment No. 13, namely that every stage of the proceedings must take place without 
undue delay. It was stated above that the right to trial without undue delay is affected 
by specific factors: complexity, conduct of the authority, conduct of the accused and 
prejudice suffered by the accused.174 As there was no discussion at all regarding the 
right to a fair trial or judicial economy, this author suggests that the best rationale for 
the Chamber’s decision is that the accused, Mr Kenyatta, would have suffered 
prejudice if proceedings were to be temporarily paused. There is no suggestion that 
this specific stage of legal proceedings was particularly complex, a characteristic 
normally associated with a high number of charges, a huge amount of evidence and 
countless witnesses.175  Likewise, nothing in the conduct of the accused or the Court 
itself could provide any justification for an alleged violation of the right to a fair trial. 
If the accused is said to have suffered prejudice, then there must be some concrete 
evidence of human rights violations.176 In the case of Mr Kenyatta, there were no 
apparent violations, and therefore there did not seem to exist any logical explanation 
as to why the Trial Chamber did not see fit to wait for the Appeals Chamber decision 
on the same matter. The following two scenarios portray two different pictures:  
5.3.1.1 Scenario 1 
A reasoned discussion regarding the application of judicial economy would have 
revealed the necessity to carry out a balancing exercise: the Court’s need to conduct 
its business in an efficient manner, against the defendant’s right to be tried without 
undue delay. On balance, it is contended that a rational discussion would have 
                                                            
174) Supra, note 78.  
175)  See, for example, Prosecutor v Mugenzi and Mugiraneza, Appeals Judgment, Case no. ICTR-99-
50-A, 4 February 2013.  
176) Prosecutor v Barayagwiza, Trial Chamber II ‘Decision on the extremely urgent motion by the 
defence for orders to review and/or nullify the arrest and provisional detention of the suspect’, Case No. 
ICTR-97-19-I, 17 November 1998 (the decision was later reversed by the Appeals Chamber, ICTR 97-
19-AR72, 3 November 1999). 
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revealed that the accused was not going to suffer any prejudice, and efficiency 
therefore had to be prioritized.  
5.3.1.2 Scenario 2 
The complete lack of a reasoned discussion on the relevant issues led to inconsistency 
and disarray between Trial Chamber (B) and the Appeals Chamber. The Appeals 
Chamber reversed Trial Chamber (A) decision on excusal from attendance, and just 
before that reversal decision, Trial Chamber (B) decided to concur with Trial 
Chamber (A). There seems to be no explanation for this apparent misuse of resources. 
6. Concluding remarks  
The Chamber’s outright rejection to engage with the principle of judicial economy 
demonstrated a real neglect for the wider picture. The international criminal justice 
machinery is still in its developing phase, and the ICC’s prerogative is to ensure that 
its credibility and legitimacy is maintained throughout all its decisions. The 
Chamber’s decision to proceed in such a hurried way lacked common sense. 
Moreover, the complete lack of a human rights perspective places the ICC in an 
awkward position regarding the interpretation and application of Article 21(3) Rome 
Statute and its mandate to uphold ‘international human rights standards’.    
As a final note, this author is mindful of the fact that the defendant in this particular 
case was the sitting President of Kenya, and the ICC prosecutorial office must indeed 
be commended for its efforts to pursue a prominent state official for the crimes (he 
allegedly) perpetrated in Kenya.177 We must remind ourselves that in the history of 
international criminal law this is the first time that such a prosecution is attempted 
against a sitting president.178 It is specifically for this reason that the ICC must be 
                                                            
177) For a discussion on the immunity of heads of state see MM Penrose, ‘It’s Good to Be the King!: 
Prosecuting Heads of State and Former Heads of State Under International Law’ (2000) 39 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 194; S Zappalà, ‘Do Heads of State in office enjoy immunity from 
jurisdiction for International Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case before the French Cour de Cassation’ (2001) 
12(3) EJIL (2001) 595; MA Summers, ‘Immunity or Impunity?: The Potential Effect of Prosecutions 
of State Officials for Core International Crimes in States like the United States that are not Parties to 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (2005-2006) 31(2) Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law 463. 
178) See GP Barnes, ‘The International Criminal Court's Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms: The 
Indictment of President Omar Al Bashir’ (2010-2011) 34(6) Fordham International Law Journal 1584. 
Although arrest warrants have been issued against Mr Al Bashir, President of Sudan, he still remains a 
free man in his own country; he has not been arrested nor has he ever voluntarily appeared at the ICC 
to face the charges against him (see Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, 
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thorough in the way it deals with the trial of a sitting president, as the lack of a 
transparent discussion may be misinterpreted as an attempt to undermine what is 
supposed to be a rigorous judicial process.  
In fact, given the alleged claims concerning bribes and threats surrounding the 
witnesses in Mr Kenyatta’s prosecution,179 the dismissal of a discussion on judicial 
economy may weaken the Court’s legitimacy and its mandate to uphold well-
recognised procedural principles. Fairness cannot be evaluated properly when an 
important discussion has been disregarded in the course of the judicial process, as it 
gives the impression of bias, either in favour and against the accused. After all, the 
suggestion that the ICC is an ‘African Court’ must be dispelled,180 rather than fuelling 
antipathy between Kenya and the ICC.181  
It is conceivable that the ICC may never get the opportunity to prosecute a sitting 
president again. Just like the current case of Mr Laurent Gbango,182 any future head of 
state appearing at the ICC as a defendant is likely to have lost an election or have 
resigned by the time the arrest and surrender to the ICC takes place. Clearly the 
symbolism about impunity accompanying the prosecution of a sitting president is 
astounding, and that message must not be underestimated. Nevertheless, it is vital that 
any issues in relation to procedural fairness are properly discussed and evaluated, 
though it is equally important that the evidence gathered at the initial investigative 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Pre-Trial Chamber I, First Arrest Warrant issued on 4 March 2009, Second Arrest Warrant issued on 
12 July 2010). Also, with regard to Charles Taylor, he was still the appointed Liberian President when 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone issued the indictment (March 2003). However, after much pressure 
from other African leaders, he resigned in August 2003 and went to Nigeria in exile; it was at this stage 
that an international arrest warrant was issued by Interpol and, following an arrest warrant issued by 
the Liberian president, he was arrested by the Nigerian police; See CC Jalloh, ‘The Law and Politics of 
the Charles Taylor Case’ (2014-2015) 43(3) Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 229. The 
trial of Laurent Gbagbo, former president of the Côte d’Ivoire, is due to start in November 2016. At the 
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179 ) See ‘ICC drops Uhuru Kenyatta charges for Kenya ethnic violence’, 5 December 2014 at 
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(2013) 11(3) JICJ 553.  
181) In fact, both the Kenyan Parliament and prominent officials have issued statements regarding the 
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ICC; see CB Murungu, ‘Towards a Criminal Chamber in the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights’ (2011) 9(5) Journal of International Criminal Justice 1067; A Abass, ‘The Proposed 
International Criminal Jurisdiction for the African Court: Some Problematical Aspects’ (2013) 
Netherlands International Law Review 60(1) 27. 
182 ) Warrant of arrest for Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, ICC02/11, November 2011; Decision on the 
confirmation of charges ICC 02/11-01/11, 12 June 2014. 
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phase is sufficiently robust to ensure a trial of this nature does not end up in a 
complete failure.183   
As a final comment on the fairness of trials at the ICC, the recent events concerning 
the collapse of the trial in the case of Mr William Samoei Ruto and Mr Joshua Arap 
Sang makes for a timely addition to this article. On 5 April 2016 the ICC Trial 
Chamber decided to vacate all charges against the accused due to unreliable 
evidence.184 More specifically, the Chamber granted the motion by the two accused 
that there is no case to answer. The Ruto defence, for example, claimed that the 
evidence was insufficient and deficient, and most importantly they claimed that the 
Prosecution fundamental flaw was its inability to link him (Mr Ruto) to the ‘Network’ 
for the purposes of forming part of an organisation in order to satisfy the requirements 
of crimes against humanity.185 Given the turn of events in the Kenyatta trial, which 
was also affected by problems in relation to the reliability of witnesses, as well as 
Kenya’s cooperation with the ICC, the conclusion of the trial of Mr Ruto and Mr 
Sang is not completely surprising.  
Before commenting on the main judgment, the dissenting opinion of Judge Herrera 
Carbuccia186 provides a useful backdrop to the general discussion on fairness at the 
ICC. She did not agree with the majority’s decision and believed that a ‘reasonable 
Trial Chamber’ could convict the accused.187 She also reiterated that the concept of 
fairness should be interpreted widely, because it is relevant to all parties; in this 
context, her assertions echoed the wider meaning of fairness discussed in this article:  
I believe that the duty of the Chamber is to ensure a fair and expeditious...However, the 
right to a fair trial must be interpreted in a flexible and comprehensive manner, as 
fairness pertains to all parties: on the one hand the accused, and on the other, the 
Prosecutor, who acts on behalf of the international community, including the victims.188  
                                                            
183) Steven Kay QC, The Prosecution of Uhuru Kenyatta at the International Criminal Court (January 
2015) <http://www.internationallawbureau.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/report.pdf> accessed 20 
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187) Ibid, para. 2.  
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 31 
More importantly, in the following passage she also noted the need to attain a 
balancing exercise between the principle of expeditiousness and the right of the 
accused to be tried without undue delay, and in this context  
Judges should not only seek to find what the parties assert. They also need to determine 
the truth, and in their task ‘[i]nterpretation may then not only be about finding what the 
parties wanted, but also what interests the community, what is required by human 
rights, or what is morally the best answer.189 
In the light of the approach taken by Judge Carbuccia, confirming the centrality (and 
expansive meaning) of the concept of fairness, it is somehow unexpected that the 
main judgment introduced a notion that does not feature at all in the ICC Rome 
Statute or the Rules of Evidence and Procedure, namely a ‘mistrial’. In the opinion of 
presiding Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji, a mistrial had to be declared because of a 
‘troubling incidence of interference with witnesses or undue meddling from an 
outside source, that is capable of prejudicial impact on the case’.190 Judge Fremr did 
not use the actual word ‘mistrial’ but stated instead that he did ‘not consider the 
impact to have been of such a level so as to render the trial null and void’191.  
Furthermore, Judge Eboe-Osuji specifically indicated that Article 64(2) supports the 
power to declare a ‘mistrial’, a power further reinforced by the ‘doctrine of incidental 
or implied powers under international law’, 192  and therefore not limited by the 
‘applicable law’ set out in Article 21.193 In fact, the interpretation adopted by Judge 
Eboe-Osuji in the context of the right to a fair trial deserves some further analysis, 
which is beyond the scope of this article. However, as a concluding remark, it is 
significant that Judge Eboe-Osuji insisted in the adoption of a teleological 
interpretation in order to achieve fairer results for all participants. He asserted that the 
adoption of a ‘broad and liberal construction to maximise protection of 
beneficiaries’194 should not just apply to human rights and humanitarian law, but also 
                                                            
189) Ibid, para. 28. An example of the implication of this dictum can be found in the context of sexual 
violence perpetrated during the Rwandan genocide, which led to the landmark judgment of Prosecutor 
v Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 2 September 1998. 
190) Ruto and Sang Acquittal, para. 7.  
191) Ruto and Sang Acquittal, para. 147. 
192)  Ruto and Sang Acquittal, Judge Eboe-Osuji, para. 191.  
193) Ruto and Sang Acquittal, Judge Eboe-Osuji, para. 192. 
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to criminal law, as, ultimately, ‘those beneficiaries are both victims of crimes and 
persons accused of crimes’. 195  In other words, the wider scope attributed to the 
concept of fairness, as seen in the dissenting opinion by Judge Carbuccia, is again 
reiterated by Judge Eboe-Osuji, leading to a controversial new concept in 
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